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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
3d Cir. 
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
 
Corporation sought a declaratory ruling by the court that Commission’s 
moratorium on fracking projects in the “Basin States” area was 
inappropriate. The district court ruled in favor of Commission, finding that 
the fracking activities under review fell within Commission’s oversight 
authority, which was the power to oversee all projects related to the water 
resources of the Basin, and, therefore, Corporation’s claim was subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Both 
the district court and appellate court dismissed Commission’s complaint 
that Corporation lacked the appropriate standing to bring its claim for 
failure of ripeness or a failure to exhaust administrative options, as 
Corporation sought a declaratory judgement regarding disparate and 
ongoing legal positions rather than an administrative appeal of a final 
judgment. Contrary to the lower court’s opinion, however, the appellate 
court found that Commission’s “Compact,” from which its oversight 
authority was derived, did not specifically address fracking activities and 
was therefore subject to further fact-finding on remand. Although the 
Compact broadly addressed projects and water resources, which, if liberally 
construed, could allow for the regulation of fracking activities by 
Commission, the presence of the word ‘for’ as a conjunctive between 
projects and water resources created ambiguous context for the intentions of 
the Compact. Corporation argued that the Compact was too loosely read to 
allow for regulation with the mere connection of a project and a water 
resource. Further, ambiguity in the term ‘project’ required more fact-
finding to determine the true intentions of the Compact. Although the 
appellate court remanded the case for further factual determinations as 
requested by Corporation, the court made no endorsement of the 








Segner v. Ruthven Oil & Gas, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-1318-B, 2018 WL 
3155827 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
 
Transferor engaged Transferee to help it find and acquire mineral interests 
in certain Oklahoma counties. Transferee acquired 197 interests and was 
paid by Transferor. Transferor filed for bankruptcy and then sued 
Transferee in bankruptcy court, claiming that the transfer was avoidable. 
The court found that the transfer was avoidable. However, Transferee was 
able to establish the affirmative defense that it received the money in 
exchange for value, in good faith, and without knowledge that the transfers 
were avoidable. The court ruled in Transferee’s favor and Transferor 
moved for a judgement as a matter of law and a new trial. Transferor 
argued that the court should award it judgment as a matter of law because 
Transferee acted in bad faith, did not present evidence regarding the value 
of the mineral interests transferred, and failed to establish defense elements 
for each one of the 197 transfers. The court denied Transferor’s judgment 
as a matter of law for several reasons. First, Transferee acted in good faith 
during the transaction. Second, Transferee did not have to present evidence 
regarding the value of the mineral interests transferred, only the value 
sufficient to support a contract. Third, Transferee submitted sufficient 
evidence to the jury. Transferor also argued that the court should order a 
new trial because the jury was prejudiced after the discussion of attorney 
fees, the jury was not instructed to look at the defense elements for each of 
the 197 transfers, the court erred in its prior findings, and the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence. The court denied the motion for a new 
trial after finding that the jury was properly instructed, not prejudiced, and 
the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. 
 
N.D. W. Virginia 
Games v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:17CV101, 2018 WL 
3433280 (N.D.W. Va. July 16, 2018). 
 
Lessor sued Lessee on claims of: (1) declaratory judgment; (2) breach of 
duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of the implied covenant 
to market; (4) emotional distress; and (5) punitive damages. Lessor 
alleged that leases between the parties expired at the end of the primary 
term and that no secondary term had been established by “Delay in 
Marketing” payments. Lessee moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
the record lacked any evidence supporting Lessor's claims. The district 
court granted the motion for summary judgment based on several findings. 
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First, the court found that the leases were properly pooled with adjoining 
tracts and thus extended into secondary terms. Second, Lessor could not 
establish any evidence to substantiate its claims of violation of the implied 
covenant to market and act in good faith. Third, Lessor did not allege any 
personal injury and thus could not recover for emotional distress. Fourth, 
the Lessor could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence any gross 
fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or 
criminal indifference to civil obligations affecting the rights of others. As 
such, the court dismissed the civil action.  
 
Upstream – State  
 
North Dakota 
Agri Indus., Inc. v. Franson, 2018 ND 156, 915 N.W.2d 146. 
 
Company sued Property Owner for breach of contract regarding failure to 
pay for well-drilling services. Property Owner then commenced a third-
party action against Corporation, alleging that Corporation was responsible 
for initial damage to the property that necessitated Company’s services. 
Following a lower court’s finding, the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, holding that the lower 
court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Corporation was legally 
and factually supported, whereas the lower court’s granting of prejudgment 
interest in favor of Company was not. The Court noted the plain language 
of the state statute, which expressed that recovery under Property Owner’s 
theory of third-party liability required a certified water quality or quantity 
test that could support the allegation of damage. The test was not performed 
within one year preceding the drilling operation as required by statute, so 
Corporation could not be liable for Property Owner’s failure to pay for 
drilling services as a matter of law. The lower court erred, however, in 
granting a post-trial motion by Company for prejudgment interest. The 
lower court held a jury trial to resolve the contractual dispute between 
Property Owner and Company following Corporation’s dismissal. The jury 
awarded Company the full amount of the contract, to which the district 
court added the interest award. Although judicial opinions had established 
the context by which an interest award would be appropriate—through 
contractual agreement and not jury determinations—the appellate court held 
that neither party had objected to the presence of interest determinations in 
front of the jury. Therefore, the Court found it appropriate in the context of 
the case to uphold the jury verdict and return the award amount to the jury’s 
initial determination.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss3/27




Gerrity Bakken, LLC v. Oasis Petroleum N. Am., LLC, 2018 ND 180, 915 
N.W.2d 677. 
 
Trustees sought an appeal from a quiet title judgment in favor of Lessees. 
Lessees originally brought suit seeking an interpretation of two deeds 
conveying mineral interests. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed 
the district court’s decision. The Court affirmed for two reasons. First, the 
Court considered the sensible construction and plain and unambiguous 
language of the deeds, finding that the fraction in the granting clauses of the 
deeds had to be applied to the fractions comprising the individual 
descriptions of the property interests conveyed by the granting clause. The 
district court properly construed the deeds by multiplying the granting 
clause fraction and the property description fraction. This calculation 
resulted in a conveyance of interests to Lessees. Second, the Court held 
that because Lessees did not acquire their interest until two years before a 
2013 quiet title judgment, the privity doctrine did not apply. Trustees 
argued that the district court’s findings constituted an impermissible 
collateral attack on the 2013 judgment. The Court, however, ruled that the 
privity doctrine did not apply concerning a judgment to which Lessees were 
not a named party.  
 
Siana Oil & Gas Co., v. Dublin Co., 2018 ND 164, 915 N.W.2d 134. 
 
Claimant initiated a quiet title action regarding the proceeds from the 
production of an oil and gas well against a multiplicity of interested parties 
claiming their own royalty interests (“Group”). Claimant asserted a sixteen 
percent (16%) interest, whereas Group asserted an eleven percent (11%) 
interest contained within Claimant’s own interest but allegedly severed in a 
1938 assignment. Claimant appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Group. Both parties asserted that their interests could 
be traced in an unbroken chain of title to their respective beginnings. The 
real property involved was subject to a 1931 tax foreclosure purchase by the 
county, after which the property was sold to a private party in 1945. The 
issue before the Supreme Court of North Dakota was the 1938 assignment 
and whether it was an appropriate instrument of transfer of severed mineral 
rights, or whether the mineral rights remained attached to the property, and 
thus transferred to Claimant as the eventual holder of the real property 
rights. The Court held that previous findings supported the notion that, even 
if earlier conveyances purported to sever a royalty interest, the tax deed 
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gave the county title to the whole estate, which was then transferred in full, 
including the royalty interests, to Claimant’s predecessor in interest. 
Therefore, Claimant had title as a matter of law and the appellate court 
reversed the lower court’s judgment. Furthermore, because the Court 
concluded that royalty interests in mineral rights cannot be possessed until 
extraction, Group’s assertions of a statute of limitations defense, adverse 
possession, or laches was not applicable. Royalty interests were not, 
therefore, attached to the real property, but rather, were conceptually 
personal property once extracted and not subject to adverse possession. 
Following satisfaction of title in Claimant, the Court remanded for further 
proceedings regarding recovery on completed royalty payments. 
 
Oklahoma 
Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, 2018 WL 3133124 (Okla. June 26, 2018).  
 
Lessee-1 brought suit against Lessee-2 to quiet title in favor of Lessee-1’s 
top leases and against Lessee-2’s lower leases. The district court found in 
favor of Lessee-2 and Lessee-1 appealed. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 
The Court’s decision was based on several grounds. First, Lessee-1 lacked 
standing to claim error in the district court’s decision to refuse to quiet title 
in his favor to some of the land. Second, the district court was right to reject 
Lessee-1’s definition of “capable.” The higher court chose a flexible 
definition, holding that that if the well was complete and producing in 
paying quantities when it was shut in, then the well remained capable. 
Third, based on the clear weight of the evidence, the district court 
appropriately found that the wells in question were capable of producing in 
paying quantities. Fourth, the well leases had not terminated under the 
habendum and cessations clauses. Fifth, the district court was correct in 
finding that the leases in question could not be canceled, based on case law 
governing the implied covenant to market, because the prerequisites for a 
demand to market had not been met. Sixth, the district court erred in not 
quieting title to Pugh Clause lands in Lessee-1’s favor. The Pugh Clause 
prevents a spacing unit well’s production from satisfying the habendum 
clause of any lease concerning acreage outside of the unit. The Pugh Clause 
does not constitute a taking in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
Lastly, the district court erred in quieting title to Non-Unit Leases in 
Lessee-2. The habendum clauses for the Non-Unit Leases were never 
satisfied, and therefore, Lessee-2’s rights to the lands terminated upon 
expiration of the primary term of the leases.  
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Thompson v. Taeda Invs., LLC, No. 12-17-00195-CV, 2018 WL 3196628 
(Tex. App. June 29, 2018). 
 
Trustee signed a property management agreement with Agent in connection 
with the management of mineral property owned by the Trust. Trustee 
agreed to pay Agent as consideration for managing the mineral property for 
a four-year term. Also, upon the execution of any oil, gas, and mineral 
lease, Trustee agreed to pay the Agent an overriding royalty interest. Agent 
negotiated a lease with a third-party. Trustee made some payments to 
Agent but refused to pay more. Agent sued for breach of contract and, 
alternatively, for declaratory judgment. The trial court granted three of 
Agent’s motions for summary judgment. First, the court declared that the 
contract was not ambiguous and payments were to continue to be made by 
Trustee. Second, it ruled that Trustee breached the agreement by failing to 
pay. Third, the court ordered Trustee to specifically perform. Trustee 
appealed, arguing: (1) that the agreement was ambiguous; (2) that the 
term “overriding royalty interest” created fact issues and therefore summary 
judgment was not appropriate; and (3) that it fully performed, and thus, 
specific performance was not appropriate. With regards to the first and 
second issue, the court held that “overriding royalty interest” did not create 
fact issues and therefore summary judgement was appropriate. As to the 
third issue, the court reasoned that the terms of the agreement were certain, 
and Trustee did not perform. Therefore, specific performance was 
appropriate. For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial court.  
 
U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC v. Laborde Props., L.P., 551 S.W. 3d 148 (Tex. 
2018). 
 
Holders of nonparticipating royalty interest in oil and gas brought action 
against Landowner, seeking a declaratory judgment that a deed reserved a 
floating 1/2 interest, resulting in a 1/10 royalty under the lease. Landowner 
counterclaimed, asserting that the deed reserved a fixed 1/16 royalty. The 
dispute centered around the interpretation of two different clauses from the 
deed: “an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to [the royalty]…in and 
under…the above described premises, the same being equal to the 1/16th of 
production.” The court reasoned that when the first clause was read 
independently, it indicated a floating royalty. The Supreme Court of 
Texas held that the second clause was not meaningless, and both clauses 
continued to be given effect in the face of leases departing from what was 
once a ubiquitous 1/8 royalty. The 1/16th clarified what a 1/2 interest in the 
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royalty amount was when the deed was executed. In support, the Court 
referred to the comma placement in the second clause, which indicated a 
nonrestrictive dependent clause. Such a clause gives additional description 
or information that is incidental to the central meaning of the sentence. For 
these reasons, the Court found that the deed reserved a floating 1/2 
royalty interest and ruled in favor of Holders. The dissent argued that the 
first clause did not clearly indicate a floating royalty and also that the two 
clauses should have been analyzed in isolation. 
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
4th Cir.  
Ergon-W. Va., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 896 F.3d 600 (4th 
Cir. 2018). 
 
Oil Company petitioned for a review of EPA’s denial of a small refinery 
exemption from renewable fuel standard program (“Program”). Program 
requires that companies blend a certain percentage of renewable fuels into 
their output but has an exception for refineries whose average aggregate 
yearly output does not exceed 75,000 barrels, if said refinery would endure 
a “disproportionate economic hardship” because of it. 45 U.S.C. § 
7545(o)(9)(B)(i). The determination of this economic hardship is performed 
by Department of Energy guidelines and the individual profitability and 
gross-net refining margins of each company. Oil Company primarily 
produces lubricants, and only a small fraction of its output is sold as fuel, 
but nonetheless is categorized as a refinery. EPA only considered in its 
review the viability of impact on Oil Company to comply with the 
standards, not the impairment of refining operations in the aggregate. The 
court granted petition for review, vacated EPA’s denial, and remanded for 
further proceedings.  
 
D.C. Cir.  
Big Bend Conservation All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 896 F.3d 
418 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (“FERC”) authorized Company to 
construct and operate an export facility including a 1,093-foot pipeline from 
Presidio County, Texas to the international border, where the facility was 
located. FERC authorized the facility under Section Three of the Natural 
Gas Policy Act (“NGPA”), which allows intrastate pipelines to transport 
gas on behalf of interstate pipelines at prices deemed fair by FERC. FERC 
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also found that the pipeline would not have a significant impact on the 
human environment and did not require Company to complete and 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). Conservation Alliance brought 
three arguments against this authorization, one of which the reviewing court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear because Conservation Alliance did not raise it in 
agency adjudication. The remaining two arguments were decided under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Conservation Alliance first contended that Company should be subject to 
Section Seven—regulating interstate pipelines—rather than Section Three 
of the NGPA. However, the court held that FERC met the arbitrary and 
capricious test for this argument. There was sufficient evidence that 
Company would be engaged only in the transport of intrastate gas and, 
therefore, subject only to regulation by the State of Texas. Conservation 
Alliance next argued that the pipeline should be subject to federal 
regulation because the export facility connected to it. The court dismissed 
the “connected actions regulation” argument based on precedent. Finally, 
Conservation Alliance contended that even if the pipeline was intrastate, the 
court should “federalize” the pipeline. The court quickly dismissed this 
argument because Conservation Alliance claimed FERC should use a test to 
determine its control over the pipeline that had been previously rejected by 
the court and replaced with a new test by FERC. 
 
Midstream – State 
 
Virginia 
Barr v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 815 S.E. 2d 783 (Va. 2018). 
 
Landowners appealed a declaratory judgment granted to Natural Gas 
Pipeline Company (“Company”), which affirmed Company’s authority to 
enter Landowners’ private property for conducting preliminary surveys and 
other activities within a range of dates to evaluate the potential location of a 
natural gas pipeline without the express permission of the landowner. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court considered the 
following. First, “whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of Va. 
Code Ann. § 56-49.01(A) (2018) (“statute”).” Landowners alleged that the 
word ‘and’ as used in the pertinent part of the statute, was conjunctive. 
They believed the statute required Company to prove that its activities were 
necessary both “to satisfy any regulatory requirements” and “for the 
selection of the most advantageous location or route.” The Court disagreed 
with Company’s argument and held that the lower court did not err when 
interpreting the language at issue in the disjunctive because reading the 
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language as conjunctive “would render certain portions of the statute 
meaningless.” Second, the Court considered whether the trial court 
misapplied the statute. The Court held that the statute was not misapplied 
for the following reasons: (1) the trial court did not rely on improper facts 
in deciding landowners demurrer; (2) the trial court did not permit 
Company to conduct activities that were not allowed by statute; and (3) the 
Court found no merit in Landowner’s argument that the statute did not 
permit Company to provide multiple date ranges when it would conduct its 
activity. Because the Court held that the trial court did not misapply the 
Statute, it did not need to undertake further consideration of whether 
Company’s subsequent authorized entry onto Landowners’ property 
resulted in an illegal taking. As such, the Court affirmed the prior 
judgement. 
 
Downstream – Federal 
 
N.D. Texas 
In re Goodrich Petroleum Corp., 894 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 
Non-Debtor, as part of a settlement agreement with Debtor, executed a 
ratification of a previously disputed mineral lease in favor of Debtor. The 
settlement agreement required Debtor to make substantial cash payments 
over time to Non-Debtor; the recorded ratification of the lease did not 
reflect this and indicated that consideration had been paid for the 
ratification. Debtor did not pay and filed bankruptcy shortly after. Non-
Debtor filed a motion seeking to compel assumption or rejection of the 
settlement agreement. Alternatively, it sought to dissolve the settlement 
agreement in its entirety. The bankruptcy court denied the motion and the 
district court affirmed. The Bankruptcy Code affords a debtor-in-possession 
the abilities of a bona fide purchaser for the debtor’s interest in immovable 
property. First, Non-Debtor argued that bona fide purchasers are not 
covered under the Louisiana Public Records Doctrine and that Debtor 
remains responsible for its obligation. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed and found that bona fide purchasers are covered under the law 
and are not responsible to pay the obligation under the settlement 
agreement. Second, Non-Debtor argued that it could dissolve the 
settlement agreement and strip the Debtor of its interest in the mineral 
lease. The court again disagreed, reasoning that under Louisiana law, if the 
public record shows that the purchase price was paid, the seller’s 
dissolution rights are not effective against third-parties. Since the lease 
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ratification showed the purchase price had been paid, the Non-Debtor could 
not dissolve the agreement. As such, Fifth Circuit court affirmed the 
judgment of the lower court.   
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Supreme Court of the United States 
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S.Ct. 2502 (2018). 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States exercised original jurisdiction 
regarding apportionment of water from an interstate river basin (“Basin”). 
Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers converge in Lake Seminole, then merge 
downstream as the Apalachicola River. Florida, the downstream state, sued 
Georgia, the upstream state, asking the Court for an equitable 
apportionment of Basin’s waters. Florida claimed that Georgia’s overuse of 
water from Basin resulted in decreased downstream flow, harming, for 
instance, Florida’s oyster industry. Florida sought a remedy in the form of a 
cap on Georgia’s water consumption from the Flint River. The lower court 
appointed a Special Master to investigate, and the Special Master concluded 
that Florida failed to make an initial showing because there was no “clear 
and convincing” evidence that the injury could be redressed by a decree 
capping Georgia’s consumption without binding the Corps, which had 
several dams and reservoirs along the Chattahoochee, where it stores water 
and controls water that flows downstream to Florida. The Special Master 
explained that relief without binding the Corps was plausible, but Florida 
had failed to show such relief was justified and adequate. On appeal, the 
Court determined that the “clear and convincing” standard was too strict, 
and the standard for a State establishing redressability is one of flexibility 
and approximation. The Special Master determined, and the Court accepted, 
that: (1) Florida had suffered harm as a result of the decreased water flow 
into the Apalachicola; (2) Georgia consumed too much water from the 
Flint; and (3) this overconsumption injured Florida. Thus, the Court 
determined the prime issue was “whether Florida had shown that a cap on 
Georgia’s consumption would redress its injury if the decree did not bind 
the Corps as well.” The Court determined that a cap was likely to fix the 
problem without necessarily binding the Corps and the extra water would 











Coors Brewing Co. v. City of Golden, 2018 CO 63, 420 P.3d 977 (2018). 
 
Beverage Manufacturer appealed a district court’s ruling that Beverage 
Manufacturer could only reuse return flows of water by adjudicating a new 
water right. Beverage Manufacturer’s original application was to amend its 
decreed augmentation plan to reuse return flows from water it had 
purposefully diverted itself. The court found that because State water 
licenses are based on a right to use, and not ownership, Beverage 
Manufacturer must adjudicate a new water right and could not amend its 
original augmentation plans. The augmentation plans did not allow reuse 
and successive use of water, and, therefore, Beverage Manufacturer did 
not adjudicate the rights of reuse and successive use. The court also found 
that Beverage Manufacturer did not own the water and, therefore, water that 
was not used in Beverage Manufacturer’s initial use had to be returned to 
the public stream. The returned flows were subject to appropriation by other 
water users because the flows are state waters. Beverage Manufacturer 
would have automatic right to reuse if the water was foreign and imported 
by Beverage Manufacturer. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the 
water court correctly interpreted Beverage Manufacturer’s decrees 
providing that Beverage Manufacturer would return all unused water back 
into the native stream. The court correctly interpreted the decrees to be 
requirements as to where the water must be returned, not only options, as 
Beverage Manufacturer argued. The Court affirmed the water court’s 
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Fed. Cir.  
Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 896 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 
This appeal centered on issues created by contracts between the United 
States government and several oil companies (“Companies”) during World 
War II to guarantee a steady supply of 100-octane aviation gas. In a related 
1991 suit filed by the U.S. and the State of California, the Ninth Circuit 
found the U.S. liable for 5.5% of the environmental impact violations under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). Companies, which were parties to both the 1991 suit and 
World War II contracts, then filed suit in an effort to recover the rest of the 
clean-up costs based on alleged breach of the World War II contracts. The 
contract clause in question specified that the U.S. would reimburse 
Companies for any additional costs they might incur during production, 
manufacture, delivery, or sale of the aviation gas. The suit was appealed on 
two motions: (1) granting Companies’ motion to prevent discovery into 
insurance coverage and settlements; and (2) denying the U.S.’ motion for 
leave to amend its answer. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit found that the lower court was correct in its calculation of 
damages and allocation of damages between parties. Additionally, the court 
held that a claim to offset damages by monies received from another 
source, such as insurance, is an affirmative defense and was therefore 
waived by the U.S. The lower court did not err in denying the U.S.’ motion 
for leave to amend because the U.S. was neither prejudiced by nor subject 
to some undue delay in understanding that the oil companies had insurance 
policies. Therefore, the U.S. lost the affirmative defense when it failed to 
assert it in the answer. 
 
N.D. W. Virginia 
Wickland v. Am. Mountaineer Energy, Inc., No. 1:17CV205, 2018 WL 
3029273 (N.D. W. Va. June 18, 2018). 
 
Landowners sued Company for breach of contract, claiming that Company 
(1) failed to make an advance royalty payment in 2017; (2) failed to mine 
coal during the lease; (3) transferred rights in the lease without 
Landowners’ consent; (4) failed to transfer various documents, permits, and 
surface rights; and (5) failed to provide maps, reports, drilling logs, and 
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surveys. Company sought to have the 2017 advance royalty payment, 
failure to mine, lost production royalties, transfer of surface rights, transfer 
of permits, and good faith and fair dealing claims dismissed. The district 
court first clarified that Landowners’ inclusion of multiple breach of 
contract claims under one count for relief did not insulate those independent 
claims from possible dismissal. The court denied Company’s motion to 
dismiss the 2017 advance royalty payment claim and lost production 
royalties claim because the court found that both claims were used as 
measures of damages sustained rather than actual claims that could be 
assessed and possibly dismissed. The court denied the motion to dismiss the 
permit transfer claim because the lease had ambiguous language as to this 
provision, which precluded dismissal. The court denied the motion to 
dismiss the surface rights transfer claim because the court found that this 
claim came down to a question of contract interpretation inappropriate for 
dismissal. The court granted Company’s motion to dismiss the failure to 
mine claim because the lease, as a whole, could not be reasonably 
interpreted to place such an obligation on Company if the lease was 
terminated before mining began. Finally, the court granted the motion to 
dismiss the good faith and fair dealing claim because Landowners failed to 
state implied good faith and fair dealing claims that were not already 
covered by other breach of contract claims.  
 
W.D. New York 
Morabito v. New York, No. 6:17-cv-06853-MAT, 2018 WL 3023380 
(W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2018). 
 
Landowners filed suit against State for alleged violations of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause because State banned high-volume hydraulic fracturing in the state, 
including on Landowners’ property. State prevailed and Landowners filed 
suit in the Federal District Court for the Western District of New York. 
Before the district court, Landowners filed two motions to amend their 
complaint, and State filed a motion to dismiss the claims. The court granted 
State’s motion to dismiss and denied Landowners’ motions to amend for 
several reasons. First, the court granted State’s motion to dismiss because 
the state had not waived its immunity to suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment and thus, the Landowners’ complaint was barred and required 
dismissal. Second, Landowners’ attempt to circumvent the Eleventh 
Amendment by suing the State Department of Environmental Conservation 
Commissioner in his individual capacity is denied because the amended 
complaint fails to show any personal actions by the Commissioner that 
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would open him to suit in an individual capacity. Finally, the Landowners’ 
Due Process claim amendment was denied under the theory of collateral 
estoppel because the issue had already been fully litigated in state court 





Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage, 424 P.3d 338 (Alaska 2018).   
 
The dispute centers around a special assessment made by Municipality to 
Property Owners of newly developed parcels of land in order to pay for the 
recent construction of road, water, and sewage improvements to the benefit 
of the parcels. Property Owners alleged the costs were improperly assessed 
for unrelated municipal projects. They also alleged that the assessment 
exceeded the cap set by local ordinance and that, because the costs 
outweighed the benefits provided by the improvements, they violated 
municipal and state law. Municipality complied with local ordinance by 
keeping separate accounts on the unrelated project and the improvements to 
Property Owners’ parcels.  Because Property Owners did not allege unfair 
bias or malice in assessing the costs, the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected 
this argument. The court also rejected Property Owners’ argument that the 
assessment exceeded a cap in AMC 19.30.040(A). The provision provided 
a cap on assessments but included an exclusion for it as assessed elsewhere 
in the title.  Three provisions relating to assessment costs on road, water, 
and sewage improvements existed elsewhere in the title and were 
applicable.  The costs assessed to Property Owners complied with these 
provisions. Finally, Property Owners alleged the assessment was grossly 
disproportionate to the increase in property value. The Court reasoned that 
property value was not the only factor to take into account when calculating 
benefit; the assessment provided roads and basic utilities necessary for 
residential development as well. The discrepancy between the total benefit 
and the assessment was not grossly disproportionate.  As such, the Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision.   
 
Florida 
City of Clearwater v. BayEsplanade.com, LLC, No. 2D17-2006, 2018 WL 
3077188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 22, 2018).  
 
Company sued City to quiet title to land that was submerged beneath a 
channel, City counterclaimed to quiet title to the same piece of land. Both 
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parties’ claims originated from quitclaim deeds: Company’s from 1957 
and City’s from 1934. The lower court granted summary judgment to 
Company, and City appealed. The appellate court held that the 1934 deed 
was not ambiguous because the granting of “all lands” to a certain point 
clearly conveyed both normal and submerged land up to that point. The 
court then held that the lower court erred in (1) concluding that there was 
ambiguity in the 1934 deed and (2) allowing extrinsic evidence to color the 
interpretation of the deed. The court also stated that using Company’s 
interpretation of the 1934 deed would have made the word “all” have no 
purpose, which runs counter to the court’s direction to follow 
interpretations that allow every word in a document to affect the 
meaning. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s 
decision and remanded the case to have quiet title granted to City. 
 
Louisiana 
Grace Ranch, LLC. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 17-1144 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
7/18/18); 2018 WL 3454981.  
 
Landowner Company sued Oil Companies, alleging that Oil Companies 
contaminated the land prior to Landowner Company’s possession of the 
land. The lower court granted summary judgment for Oil Companies, 
and Landowner Company appealed the case with five claims of error: (1) 
the claim should not have been dismissed under the subsequent purchaser 
rule; (2) the assignments of surface and mineral rights from previous 
owners should have provided a claim; (3) one particular assignment of 
claims should not have been found invalid; (4) prescription should not 
have been used for dismissal; and (5) the jurisprudential subsequent 
purchaser rule should not have been used, since the claim had statutory 
support. The appellate court rejected the inapplicability of the subsequent 
purchaser rule to a purely mineral estate claim because the court found from 
previous case decisions that the rule is properly applicable for cases of both 
surface and mineral ownership. It then rejected the claim that statutory 
language made a mineral lease a real right, inherited with the land, which 
would allow a subsequent purchaser to sue for prior property damages 
because statutes and previous case decisions indicated that a mineral lease 
is a real right which does not automatically attach to property. It also 
rejected the argument that the acquisition of the property would allow suit 
to be brought against those with a mineral lease to the property because 
the mineral leases had expired before Landowner Company actually 
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acquired the property. The one assignment of claims found invalid was 
upheld as invalid because the company that gave that assignment dissolved 
itself as a corporation and waived its right to pursue any “outstanding 
claims,” so it could not pass them. The court declined to address the issue 
of prescription because Landowner Company had “no right of action.” 
Accordingly, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.  
 
Pennsylvania 
New Hope Crushed Stone & Lime Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1373 
C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 3447581 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 7, 2018). 
 
Company petitioned court to review an order to dismiss Company’s appeal 
from Department’s modification of Company’s Reclamation Plan. 
Company mined a quarry located in the same township as Solebury School. 
Department had determined that the mining and dewatering of the water 
table was creating a public nuisance and causing sinkholes to open on 
School grounds. The court affirmed the order to dismiss for several reasons. 
First, the disputed adjudication pertaining to the quarry was never appealed 
to the Environmental Hearing Board and was decided by applicable law 
correctly. Second, the determination that the quarry was a nuisance was 
subject to collateral estoppel and administrative fidelity. Third, there were 
no improper restrictions imposed on Company’s discovery requests relating 
to School grounds connected to the quarry. Fourth, the Department’s 
modified requirements for the Company were not made arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal 
court rules should be consulted before citing this case as precedent.  
 
Wyoming 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Box Creek Mineral Ltd. P’ship, 420 P.3d 161 (Wyo. 
2018). 
 
Mineral Company sued Railroad Company to get declaratory judgment and 
quiet title to the mineral rights in land given to Railroad Company via two 
deeds from 1913. The lower court found the deeds to be ambiguous and 
thus refused summary judgment. At a bench trial, the lower court found that 
the deeds only conveyed an easement to Railroad Company, so the court 
granted Mineral Company its declaratory judgment and quiet title. Railroad 
Company appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Wyoming with 
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issues as to (1) whether the deeds were actually easements or not and (2) 
whether the lower court was correct in admitting Mineral Company’s expert 
witness testimony. The Court starts its analysis by agreeing with the lower 
court’s finding that the deeds are ambiguous because “both deeds convey a 
‘strip of land’ without any limitation,” but also grant the use of land for 
specific purposes, implying limitations on granted land rights, and both 
deeds granted an ambiguous “right of way” on the land. The Court then 
upheld the finding that the deeds granted easements because the meaning 
of “right of way,” as understood in 1913, meant an easement and, 
additionally, the terms of the deed as a whole only make sense when read as 
granting an easement, and not a limitless estate in the land. The Court 
found fault with the admission of Mineral Company’s expert witness 
testimony because the lower court provided no specific findings as to how 
it determined the expert witness as admissible. However, the Court found 
that this error was ultimately harmless because the lower court could still 
have found the deeds to be granting nothing more than an easement without 
the expert testimony. Thus, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision to 
quiet title to the disputed mineral rights.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
504 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 




Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 
In a putative class action suit, utility customers (“Customers”) brought suit 
against two electric utility companies (“Utilities”). Utilities had been 
collecting rate increases from Customers for the construction of a nuclear 
plant. Construction of the nuclear plant ceased, but Utilities continued to 
collect rate increases as authorized by two provisions of the Florida 
Renewable Energy Technologies and Energy Efficiency Act (“Act”), which 
allowed for the creation of the Nuclear Cost Recovery System (NCRS). 
Customers alleged that the NCRS was invalid under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause (“DCC”) and that the Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) 
preempted the NCRS. Customers sought injunctive relief through the Act’s 
invalidation. The United States District Court granted Utilities’ motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied Customers’ request for leave 
to amend. Customers appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and the court affirmed the decisions of the District Court. First, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of the Utilities’ DCC claim – “Utilities are not 
‘states’ such that their actions could give rise to DCC claims from an out-
of-state person or entity.” Second, the court held the AEA did not preempt 
the NCRS. Customers could not show that “state laws promoting 
investment in new nuclear power plants, or shifting the costs of nuclear 
plant construction,” were preempted by government regulation in the AEA. 
Third, the court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Utilities’ request for leave to amend on procedural grounds and on 
the grounds that amendment sought would violate the Eleventh 
Amendment. In affirming the findings of the District Court, the court also 
affirmed that the Utilities’ complaint failed to state a claim. 
 
Renewable Generation  
 
E.D. Michigan 
Tuscola Wind III, LLC v. Almer Charter Twp., No. 17–cv–10497, 2018 WL 
2937409 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2018). 
 
Wind Company brought suit against Township for denying its Special Land 
Use Permit (“SLUP”) to build a wind farm. Wind Company alleged that 
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Township’s denial of its SLUP violated Wind Company’s procedural due 
process and equal protection rights. Wind Company further argued that the 
moratorium on wind farms violated the Zoning Enabling Act, and 
Township violated the Open Meetings Act when four newly-elected 
members met before a public meeting. Township moved for summary 
judgment on all counts. The court found that Wind Company’s procedural 
due process rights were not violated because pending building permits 
cannot create a property interest and granted Township’s motion. The court 
found no equal protection violation occurred when Township denied the 
SLUP. Township had complete discretion to deny a SLUP, and Wind 
Company failed to show that Township denied the SLUP due to animus 
towards Wind Company. The court found that Township had not violated 
the Zoning Enabling Act when it passed a moratorium on wind farm 
because the issue was moot. The decision would therefore count as an 
advisory opinion. The court denied Township’s motion for summary 
judgment in part for the alleged violation of the Open Meeting Act. 
Members-elect were not specifically mentioned in the Act and members-
elect have no power to bring them within the ambit of the Act. Township 
did not prove as a matter of law that no violation occurred during an email 
chain between Township members and denied Township’s motion for 
summary judgment regarding that issue. 
 
North Carolina 
Recurrent Energy Dev. Holdings, LLC v. SunEnergy1, LLC, No. 18-1164, 
2018 WL 3105507 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2018). 
 
Purchaser contracted with Developer for the sale of two solar energy 
projects and a tax equity transaction with a third solar project. Purchaser 
signed a Confidential Letter of Intent (“LOI”) with Developer granting 
exclusive rights to purchase two of the solar energy projects with an agreed 
upon timeline for development. The parties expressly agreed to negotiate in 
good faith for the tax equity investment to go through with the third solar 
energy project. Developer agreed to reimburse Purchaser for costs 
associated with this transaction. Purchaser sued Developer for breaches of 
the LOI and the fee letter and sought a declaratory judgment. Developer 
counterclaimed for breach of LOI. Purchaser moved for summary judgment 
on its claims. The court found that: (1) Developer breached the LOI when it 
failed to meet deadlines for the solar energy projects; (2) Developer failed 
because of a wetland permitting issue; and (3) Purchaser requested a full 
refund instead of accepting a replacement solar energy project. The court 
also found that Purchaser was entitled to an additional refund for the Haslett 
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Exclusivity Payment pursuant to the LOI in the amount of $750,000. The 
court found that the breach by Purchaser did not excuse Developer of his 
obligations. The court denied Purchaser’s motion for summary judgment 
involving the breach of good faith allegation by Developer because intent 
of a party is a question for the jury. The court denied Developer’s motion 
for summary judgment because the LOI expressly stated that Purchaser 
could only exercise a replacement project provision in lieu of a full refund 
with a written statement. The court denied that Purchaser’s actions 
constituted acceptance of a replacement site project and read the contract as 
written, stating that there must be written notification of an exercise of the 
LOI. Thus, Purchaser’s allegations of breach of good faith, and the breach 
of fee letter will proceed to trial. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 





Ga. Power Co. v. Cazier, 815 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 2018).  
 
Consumers sued Power Company, alleging that Power Company was 
collecting franchise fees in excess of the amounts authorized by the Public 
Service Commission (“Commission”). The Supreme Court of Georgia 
affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that the trial court erred 
when dismissing Consumers’ putative class action for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies with the Commission. The Court noted that there 
was no statute giving Commission exclusive jurisdiction over such claims 
and pointed out that Commission’s power was legislative in nature and 
limited to regulating rates. As a result, Consumers were not required to 
exhaust administrative remedies and were free to seek judicial relief, even 
though Consumers’ allegations against Power Company implicated 
Commission’s ambiguous terms concerning franchise fees. The Court noted 
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would have allowed the trial court 
to suspend the trial and refer the issue of the ambiguous language 
concerning the collection of franchise fees to Commission. For those 
reasons, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision to vacate the trial 








Tex. Indus. Energy Consumers v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., No. 03-17-
00490-CV, 2018 WL 3353225 (Tex. App. July 10, 2018). 
 
Electric Power Company (“Company”) filed an application with the Public 
Utility Commission of Texas (“Commission”) to authorize Company to 
build a substantial coal-fire power plant. Commission granted the 
application if Company amended its certificate of convenience and 
necessity to show all receipts and agreements required for construction in 
the future. Commission capped the spending at $1.522 billion by relying on 
the current estimate for costs. Company looked to increase the spending by 
$83 million. Company took this increase to the State Office for an 
administrative hearing in front of an ALJ. ALJs found that Company 
justified its power plant based on a relative price of coal to natural gas. The 
price fell, and a reasonable utility manger would have considered cancelling 
the construction of the power plant. ALJs concluded that Company did not 
evaluate all the relevant factors regarding building the plant and concluded 
that a reasonably prudent utility manager at the time would have cancelled 
the project. Commission adopted the ALJs’ findings. However, 
Commission departed from the ALJs’ finding that Company’s decision to 
continue the construction of the plant was unreasonable. Company appealed 
the Commission’s decision on the amount of capital costs. To determine the 
capital costs, the appellate court determined whether the Commission 
correctly found that Company met its burden of proving that it was prudent 
to continue construction. According to the appellate court, Company did not 
evaluate the decision reasonably, because it used the testimony of its own 
employees. Because the issue is dispositive of the appeal, the appellate 
court reversed the trial court’s judgment that Company met its burden of 
proving that it was prudent in continuing to complete the plant. 
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Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Pruitt, 893 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Multiple environmental and citizen groups (“Advocates”) brought suit 
against EPA for failing to perform its “nondiscretionary duty to promulgate 
[total maximum daily loads (“TMDL”)] for biologically impaired waters,” 
as West Virginia has yet to do so. Each state is responsible for submitting a 
list of TMDLs to EPA for approval. If EPA rejects the list, EPA has a duty 
to create a new list for the state to implement. West Virginia postponed the 
development of TMDLs for pollutants found in contaminated waters, as 
required by the Clean Water Act. The district court determined that West 
Virginia’s failure to provide TMDLs to EPA constituted “constructive 
submission” of TMDLs, requiring EPA to effectively reject the state’s 
inaction, triggering EPA’s duty to create TMDLs for West Virginia. There 
is a circuit court split over the existence and application of the constructive 
submission doctrine. However, the Fourth Circuit did not have to apply the 
doctrine. In jurisdictions that apply the doctrine, EPA’s duty is not triggered 
where the state has submitted some TMDLs and has a legitimate plan to 
create more TMDLs. Because West Virginia satisfied both prongs, the 
constructive submission doctrine did not apply, and EPA had no duty to act 
for West Virginia. As such, the appellate court held for EPA. 
 
Schoene v. McElroy Coal Co., No. 16-1788, 2018 WL 3202769 (4th Cir. 
June 29, 2018).  
 
Owners of surface estate (“Surface Owner”) brought suit against owners of 
subsurface estate (“Subsurface Owner”) alleging (1) a claim for loss of 
support to the surface estate under West Virginia common law and (2) a 
statutory claim based on the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and 
Reclamation Act. Importantly, the deed transferring the coal rights 
contained an express waiver of damages for loss of surface support. The 
Supreme Court of West Virginia, in response to certified questions, held 
that, under West Virginia common law, the contractual provision was 
enforceable and barred recovery for damages from loss of surface support 
attributable to the Subsurface Owner. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding that the Surface Owner had 
a cause of action under common law. Further, the Fourth Circuit found that 
the district court needed to resolve a threshold issue of whether the 
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Subsurface Owner’s mining activities caused material damage to the 
surface owner’s land or residence before deciding whether they were 
entitled to relief under the West Virginia statutes. Since the district court’s 
findings only concerned the measure of damages, the Fourth Circuit 
remanded the case with instructions for the jury to consider whether the 
subsurface owner violated a rule, order or permit under the Act that would 
enable the surface owner to recover for the loss of support. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
7th Cir. 
Orchard Hill Building Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 893 F.3d 
1017 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 
Company challenged a jurisdictional decision by Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”) that designated a 13-acre plot of Warmke wetlands purchased by 
Company as “jurisdictional waters” of the United States pursuant to the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The aim of the CWA is to prevent pollution of 
navigable waters, or waters of the United States, designated by the Corps. 
The closest navigable water to the Warmke wetlands is the 11-mile-away 
Little Calumet River. Corps determined the Warmke wetlands were 
adjacent to the Midlothian Creek, a tributary of the River, and thus, waters 
of the United States. While this case was on appeal, the Supreme Court 
determined that Corps’ jurisdiction over similar wetlands depends upon a 
significant nexus between the wetlands and navigable waters. Corps 
repeatedly determined that the Warmke wetlands, “alone or in conjunction 
with the area’s other wetlands, have a significant nexus to the Little 
Calumet River.” Company then sought judicial review of Corps’ decision 
as a “final agency action” under the APA. The APA allows courts to set 
aside an agency determination if it is unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Corps’ proposition that the Warmke wetlands have the “ability” to pass 
pollutants along is too speculative to support a significant nexus. 
Additionally, the Warmke wetlands comprise 2.7 percent of the Midlothian 
Creek watershed, which is relatively insubstantial. The record did not show 
that the wetlands in the Midlothian Creek watershed are adjacent to the 
same tributary and thus U.S. waters. Thus, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Corps failed to show substantial evidence of the 
wetlands’ significant nexus to navigable-in-fact waters, and the case was 
vacated and remanded for Corps to reconsider.  
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Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the United States, 894 
F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2018).   
 
Non-profit environmental organizations (“Environmental Organizations”) 
sued Bank for alleged violations of several environmental protection Acts 
including the Endangered Species Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and 
the National Historic Preservation Act for providing loans for two liquid 
natural gas projects near the Great Barrier Reef. Bank moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds of lack of standing, claiming that there was no 
method of redress the injuries, since they merely funded the projects. The 
district court granted summary judgement, finding that Environmental 
Organizations failed to establish redressability due to the Bank’s minor role 
in the projects. Essentially, the district court found that Bank was not a 
party necessary to the completion of the project and, therefore, additional 
performance of procedures would not redress the injuries. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was nothing in the record 
suggesting that the Bank had any ongoing influence on the operation of the 
projects. Further, the projects were already under construction before the 
Bank authorized the loans, which only consisted of a small portion of the 
total funding. Due to these shortcomings, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Environmental Organizations failed to show that performing any additional 
procedures under the Acts could redress the injuries allegedly sustained and 
affirmed summary judgment.   
 
D.C. Cir. 
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 895 F.3d 102 
(D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
Environmental Organization (“Organization”) filed suit against Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) alleging FERC’s funding 
structure deprived it of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The 
United States District Court granted the FERC’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. The appeal by Organization presented “broad due-
process challenges to how the FERC conducts business.” The complaint 
alleged that FERC’s “funding structure creates structural bias, in violation 
of the Due Process Clause . . . , by incentivizing the Commission to approve 
new pipelines.” The complaint also challenged FERC’s use of tolling 
orders. Organization alleged that FERC routinely allowed construction to 
proceed on approved projects, while the application was still pending, 
which frustrates judicial review, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
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Organization grounded its due process claim in environmental interests and 
in real-property interests. The court concluded that the state-created right to 
clean air, pure water, and preservation of the environment did not qualify as 
a federally protected liberty or property interest for due process purposes. 
On whether any protected liberty or property interest was implicated, the 
court held that FERC was not structurally biased for the following reasons: 
(1) FERC did not control the funds it collected; (2) fees and charges did 
not go into FERC coffers; (3) FERC’s budget was fixed regardless of how 
many pipelines FERC approved; and (4) FERC did not have influence over 
Congress. Further, the court had long held that “FERC’s use of tolling 
orders is permissible under the Natural Gas Act, and Organization has not 
shown that FERC’s tolling practice violates due process in each instance 
such that the standard should be overturned.” Because Organization’s due 
process claims lacked merit, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgement. 
 
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 896 F.3d 520 
(D.C. Cir. 2018).   
 
Company applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(“Commission”) for a license to operate a uranium mine in Tribe’s territory. 
Tribe intervened to challenge the application, citing possible damage to 
Tribe’s cultural sites. Commission’s licensing process includes three stages: 
(1) the Commission Staff’s (“Staff”) review; (2) the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board’s (“Board”) review; and (3) Commission’s own review 
and subsequent approval or rejection. While in Staff review, Staff drafts an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), which outlines the effects of the 
license holder’s operations on the environment. In the case at hand, Staff 
drafted the EIS and approved the license but failed to include any 
possible adverse effects the operation would have on the tribe’s cultural 
sites. Board ruled that this omission was a “significant deficiency” and 
ordered Staff to cure the deficiency but refused the Tribe’s request to stay 
the license during the cure period. The matter then came to Commission, 
who generally upheld the license approval, and Tribe appealed. On 
review, the United States District Court analyzed only the decision to leave 
Applicant’s license in effect while the Staff cured the deficiency. The court 
analyzed the Board’s ruling and noted that the Board had contemplated that 
the EIS was to be completed before granting a license. The court concluded 
that an EIS conducted with a “significant deficiency” was incomplete for 
purposes of granting a license. Thus, the license should not be effective 
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before the deficiency is cured. The court made clear that this ruling was 
limited to EIS drafts with “significant deficiencies,” and that the Board still 
had the power to effectuate licenses while less severe deficiencies are being 
cured. The court dismissed the Board’s “irreparable harm” requirement as 
uprooted in statute.   
 
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) brought suit against the Secretary 
of the Interior (“Secretary”) in order to compel Secretary to update and 
supplement the Federal Coal Management Program. The district court 
dismissed the action and Advocates appealed. In order for Advocates to 
prevail on an Administrative Procedure Act claim, they would have to show 
that Secretary failed to perform a ministerial, incomplete, federal action. A 
court can only compel an agency to act when the agency has a 
nondiscretionary duty to perform that same action and has failed to do so. 
Outdated provisions in the program required occasional updates to reflect 
new science regarding pollution and the environmental impact. In 1979, 
Secretary completed and implemented the program, which included 
provisions about updating the program. In 1982, Secretary updated the 
program and removed the provisions that governed how to modify the 
program. The D.C. Circuit Court held that Secretary’s federal, ministerial 
action was completed with the 1982 update and that there was no further 
intention to continue changing the program, evidenced by the removal of 
relevant provisions. Thus, the only federal action was the creation of the 
program, not the on-going activities of the program. As such, the appellate 
court affirmed the judgment for Secretary. 
 
D. Montana 
ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., CV 12–53–H–DLC, 2018 WL 3122340 
(D. Mont. June 26, 2018). 
 
Lessor brought suit against Lessee for damages incurred at a site that was 
determined under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to be a National Priorities List 
(“NPL”) site. As a NPL site, the EPA required environmental remediation 
for the environmental contamination produced by the plants owned by both 
the Lessor and Lessee. As the part of an earlier settlement, Lessor had paid 
over $111.4 million in response costs for the site. The court found that 
Lessee’s zinc fuming operations released arsenic into the groundwater at 
the site, partially driving the cleanup effort. Further, the court found that 
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Lessee was a “person,” as defined by the Act as an owner and/or operator 
of a facility from which hazardous substances were disposed. As a result, 
Lessee caused Lessor to incur response costs, and Lessor was entitled to 
seek contribution payments from Lessee. Lessee argued that the lease 
agreement barred Lessor’s claim, but the court found that the plain 
language stated that Lessor did not assume the liability arising from 
Lessee’s operation of the facility. The court also found that Lessor had 
already paid more than its equitable share of the response costs and that 
Lessee was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of contribution 
costs paid by Lessor. The court used the so-called Gore Factors to guide its 
allocation of cleanup costs and found that Lessee’s equitable share of the 
costs was 25% of the response costs paid by Lessor. Additionally, the court 
found that Lessee had repeatedly made misrepresentations and misled the 
EPA in the amount of emissions and contaminants flowing from the plant. 
As a result, the court awarded the Lessor an additional payment of $1 
million for the lack of cooperation.  
 
D. New Mexico 
Nuclear Watch N.M.  v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 1:16-cv-00433 
JCH/SCY, 2018 WL 3405256 (D.N.M. July 12, 2018). 
 
A citizen action group (“Group”) filed a citizen’s suit against the United 
States Department of Energy (“DOE”), a private contractor (“Contractor”), 
and New Mexico Environment Department (“NMED”) for alleged 
violations of a compliance and consent order (“2005 Order”) instituted to 
remediate dangers to the environment posed by the presence of hazardous 
waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (“Laboratory”). Eventually, a 
new order (“2016 Order”) expressly superseded the 2005 Order. The 2016 
Order included all alleged outstanding violations of the 2005 Order and 
encompassed the full scope of corrective actions mandated by it. In the 
complaint, Group: (1) sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the 
implementation of 2016 Order; (2) sought to discontinue deadline 
extensions of the 2005 Order; and (3) requested civil penalties for 
violations of the 2005 Order. DOE, NMED, and Contractor all filed 
motions to dismiss.  To the extent that the complaint sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, the court granted the motions to dismiss. The court found 
that this was a “case of one consent order replacing another.” In the eyes of 
the law, the 2005 Order no longer existed. The claims for injunctive and 
declaratory relief were moot as NMED, DOE, and contractor could not be 
held liable for alleged violations of an order that no longer existed. To the 
extent the complaint sought civil penalties, the court denied the motions to 
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dismiss. Prior rulings had left the imposition of civil penalties for violations 
that had already taken place to the discretion of district courts. For the civil 
penalties to be moot, DOE, NMED and Contractor had a burden to prove 
that the 2016 Order would make the alleged violations of the 2005 Order 
unlikely to recur, and the court found that they had not met their burden 
of proof. 
 
D. North Dakota 
Voigt v. Coyote Creek Mining Co., No. 1:15-cv-00109, 2018 WL 3244408 
(D.N.D. July 3, 2018).  
 
Ranchers brought suit against Mining Company for allegedly not obtaining 
the correct type of Clean Air Act permit for the construction and operation 
of its coal mine. Mining Company had applied for a “minor source permit” 
with the North Dakota Department of Health (“NDDOH”), pursuant to EPA 
regulations that rely on states for implementation and enforcement. 
Ranchers moved for partial summary judgment in regard to certain issues of 
liability while Mining Company moved for summary judgement of 
dismissal. The primary issue for the court was whether Mining Company’s 
open coal storage pile and haul road constituted part of the coal processing, 
which would be subject to Subpart Y’s regulations for emission standards. 
Unable to find a clear answer from the regulations themselves, the court 
turned to guidance from the EPA, which stated that the beginning of coal 
processing is when it is dropped at the first hopper for receipt of coal. 
Again, the court found that this answer was not clear enough to make a 
decision. In response to the lack of clarity, the court gave deference to the 
NDDOH’s determination that the coal piles and haul roads did not 
constitute part of the coal processing facility and, therefore, were not 
subject to Subpart Y.  Additionally, the court had previously found that the 
majority of the open coal storage pile was not simply temporary storage 
but, rather, largely unprocessed coal, leading to the conclusion that it would 
not be consistent with EPA policies to allow it to count as part of the coal 
processing facility. The court found that even if it accepted Ranchers’ 
estimates on emissions, Ranchers had not sufficiently shown an ability to 
prove that the 250 tons per year major threshold could be reached. As a 
result of these findings, the court granted the Mining Company’s motion for 








Edgar v. Anadarko Petroleum Co., No. 17–1372, 2018 WL 3032573 (S.D. 
Tex. June 19, 2018). 
 
Investors sued Company for making false statements that misled 
shareholders, thereby violating the Exchange Act and the Security 
Exchange Commission’s Rule. Company filed a motion to dismiss, making 
various statements that Investors claimed were misleading, but the 
statements were not specific or concrete enough to be considered more than 
“corporate cheerleading.” Furthermore, the timeline of evidence that 
Investors cited showed that Company made almost all of the alleged false 
statements before the events that retroactively made the statements false. 
Essentially, Company’s statements were not false at the time they were 
made. While the court found that the majority of the statements did not 
establish a prima facie case, one statement Investors pointed to in their 
pleadings was temporally correct in alleging that Company made false 
statements. However, the legal test underlying the allegation could not be 
satisfied completely based on the pleadings because Investors failed to 
show that Company spoke with scienter. For those reasons, the court 
granted Company’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, and gave time for 





Stevenson v. Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control, C.A. No. S13C-12-
025 RFS, 2018 WL 3134849 (Del. Super. Ct. June 26, 2018). 
 
Delaware passed a regulation called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(“RGGI”), and Ratepayer alleged that it created a financial injury to its 
customers. RGGI placed a cap on carbon dioxide emitted by power plants. 
RGGI removes an allowance if a power plants produces more carbon 
dioxide than is allowed. Ratepayers in states that have energy efficient 
programs receive the allowance. Because of this regulation electric 
companies must raise prices when they lose an allowance. Ratepayer argues 
that RGGI affects the price of electricity by raising it. The appellate court 
found Ratepayer to have no standing, but the appellate court provided 
examples of how a regulation would affect a customer and give them 
standing. To show that it would be probable for the regulations to increase 
prices, plaintiffs must show research methods, data, evaluation techniques 
that support the conclusion. Finally, according to the appellate court, 
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because there was no proof of the regulations causing the increase in prices, 
a favorable decision would not guarantee a remedy. Accordingly, the 
Superior Court of Delaware dismissed the case because the Ratepayer 
failed to provide expert testimony that demonstrated standing.  
 
Maryland 
Stevens v. Prettyman Manor Mobile Home Park Wastewater Treatment 
Plant, 187 A.3d 715 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018). 
 
Objectors appealed a trial court’s affirmation of the Maryland Department 
of the Environment’s (“MDE”) issuance of Permit to Wastewater Company 
to discharge treated wastewater into a tributary. Objectors asked for judicial 
review on questions of: (1) whether MDE published proper notice; and (2) 
whether Permit grants discharge of solids in a different way than described 
in a 2012 application. The court held that MDE’s revised application 
published in 2014 did not require notice because the 2014 application was 
only a revised application of the previously published 2012 application. The 
court found that this interpretation of Notice Requirement was reasonable, 
as the revisions were not substantial. Furthermore, Objectors waived their 
right to object by making their objections after the official comment period. 
Additionally, the court also found that MDE worked with Wastewater 
Company for several years to effectively revise the 2012 application to 
comply with statutory requirements. MDE did not find these differences 
substantial enough to warrant a new notice. Because MDE is an expert in 
permits, the court granted deference to its expertise. The court found that 
an agency’s application of statutes is given weight pursuant to the agency’s 
experience and expertise. As such, the appellate court affirmed the 
judgement of the circuit court.  
 
New Jersey 
320 Assocs., LLC v. New Jersey Nat. Gas Co., No. A-1831-16T2, 2018 WL 
3189466 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 29, 2018).  
 
Property Owner sued Natural Gas Company (“Company”) asserting various 
claims, including negligence, violation of New Jersey statutes, and nuisance 
for allowing migration of coal tar pollution onto Property Owner’s land. As 
a result, Property Owner claimed that it was unable to obtain an 
unconditional “no action letter” from the Department of Environmental 
Protection, which was necessary in order to execute an agreement to buy 
with their tenant, causing a permanent diminution in value to the property. 
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Allegedly, Property Owner could not obtain the letter due to Company’s 
failure to abate the pollution. Company filed a motion to dismiss based on 
the applicable six-year statute of limitations. The court then applied the 
discovery rule and held that since Property Owner, at best, learned of the 
condition in 2008, its claim for diminution in value was untimely. Further, 
the court held that the migration of the pollutants did not constitute a new 
discharge under the Spill Act, and therefore, Property Owner’s claim for 
negligence was also untimely. However, the court found that the failure to 
abate the pollution constituted a continuing tort and was therefore timely. 
For this claim, the court held that since the land could never be remediated 
to reverse the damage to the land, Property Owner could only seek claims 
to the extent the land could be remediated and for the unreasonable delay in 
abating the nuisance. Since the record was silent regarding factual findings, 
the court affirmed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings 
regarding the nuisance claims.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
New York 
State v. Ronney, 163 A.D.3d 1315, 2018 WL 3463146 (N.Y. App. Div. July 
19, 2018). 
 
State sued owners of an oil storage facility (“Owners”) to recover 
governmental funds spent on cleaning up Owners’ oil leak. The district 
court denied Owners’ motion for partial summary judgment to reduce 
State’s claimed damages, and Owners appealed. The Navigation Law 
(“Law”) holds oil dischargers strictly liable for any spills or leaks and 
requires that the discharger contact the Department of Environmental 
Conservation (“DEC”). At that point, DEC sends agents to clean the 
contamination. State obtained federal grant funds to aid the clean-up 
process. Owners argued that State recovering those funds would result in 
unjust enrichment because State would effectively recover twice. Owners 
also argued that recovering funds that came from the federal grant would 
effectively be compensation, which is barred by Law. The New York 
Appellate Division Supreme Court held that since State would be 
replenishing the funds and accounts used for the clean-up, Owners would 
actually receive a windfall if they did not reimburse State. Such 
reimbursement is not considered to be compensation, as the source of the 
federal grant is not contemplated in the Law’s language. 
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Harris Design Servs. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., No. 2017–0436, 2018 
WL 3147958, 2018-Ohio-2395. 
 
Customer brought suit against its natural gas service Company for alleged 
failure to give adequate notice of disconnection. When a cable company hit 
a gas line and disconnected the service, Company sent a technician to repair 
the line. When the technician finished the repairs, he left the valve locked 
so no gas could enter the structure until the service was reestablished. He 
then left a tag on Customer’s door notifying them to contact Company to 
reestablish the line pursuant to Company policy. When the line was 
damaged again, the technician left another tag on the door. Eventually, 
Customer brought a claim in the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(“PUCO”) after the gas line froze and the structure’s pipes burst, causing 
damage. PUCO ruled in favor of Company, and Customer brought three 
issues on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio: (1) that PUCO, who acted 
as the fact-finder in this case, erred in finding that door-tags were placed on 
the door; (2) that PUCO’s rehearing process for the case was inadequate; 
and (3) that PUCO erred in the exclusion of certain evidence. On the first 
issue, the Court deferred to the PUCO’s finding that the door-tags 
constituted adequate notice because there was sufficient probative evidence 
in the record that the tags were actually placed there, and there was nothing 
unlawful or unreasonable in PUCO’s holding that it was adequate. On the 
second issue, the Court held that since the issues Customer raised on appeal 
were not raised in their rehearing arguments, it could not consider these 
arguments for the first time. Further, the Court held that PUCO did not err 
by affirming the exclusions of evidence by the attorney examiner since it 
did not reflect an abuse of its very broad discretion to conduct its hearings.  
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